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And how on earth is it to be decided which of the two things it is rational 
to be most certain of? 




 E. MOORE’S LEGACY TO MORAL philosophy has been 
both profound and controversial. Most notably, his Principia Ethi-
ca is often treated as a crucial starting point for work in what is 
now typically called “metaethics,” and metaethicists have returned again and 
again to defend, debunk or diagnose the appeal of his Open Question argu-
ment. This paper examines the implications for moral philosophy of one of 
Moore’s other famous (or, depending upon your tastes, infamous) forms of 
argument: the table-turning maneuver that he deployed against the epistemo-
logical skeptic and the metaphysical idealist.  
Against such revisionary metaphysical and epistemological views, Moore 
claimed that the following constitutes a proof of the existence of his hands, 
and thereby of the external world:  
 
I can prove now, for instance, that two human hands exist. How?  By holding 
up my two hands and saying, as I make a gesture with the right hand, “Here is 
one hand,” and adding as I make a certain gesture with the left, “and here is 
another.” (1959, 145-6) 
 
The (implicit) remainder of the proof can be represented as follows:   
 
HANDS          1.  If the external world did not exist, then I would not have hands. 
2.  I have hands.   
3.  The external world exists.1 
 
Just as some global skeptics and idealists purport to diagnose and cor-
rect deep errors in common-sense thinking about the external world, many 
philosophers have challenged what they take to be common sense about mo-
rality.2 A particularly radical form of revisionism is metaethical error theory. As I 
am thinking of it, metaethical error theory consists of two claims. First, error 
                                                 
1 Such arguments may strike some readers as absurd. They deserve careful examination, if 
only because of the number of prominent contemporary philosophers who endorse them. 
These include Armstrong 1999, Fine 2001, Kelly 2005, Lewis 1996, Lycan 2001 and Pryor 
2000, 2004. 
2 The views that I have in mind include normative ethical theories that explicitly attack 
“common-sense morality” (e.g. Parfit 1984, Kagan 1989) and epistemological skepticism 
about morality (e.g. Sinnott-Armstrong 2006). In this paper I treat metaethical error theory 
(e.g. Mackie 1977, Joyce 2001) as the exemplary revisionary view, ignoring potentially crucial 
differences between this and the other cases. 
G.
JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 3, NO. 2 




theorists are descriptivists in moral semantics: they claim that in our standard 
use of moral language, we purport to predicate moral properties such as 
goodness or wrongness of acts, agents, etc. Second, they are nihilists about 
moral metaphysics: they claim that nothing has such moral properties.3 
Someone favorably disposed toward Moore’s response to the skeptic 
and the idealist might be tempted by an analogous response to revisionist 
views in ethics. Such a response is exemplified by the following argument 
against error theory:  
 
NO ERROR            1. If metaethical error theory were true, then torturing innocent 
children just for fun would not be wrong. 
2.  Torturing innocent children just for fun is wrong.4 
3.  Metaethical error theory is false.  
 
Some recent discussions of metaethical error theory and nihilism can be in-
terpreted as appealing in part to the sort of argument offered in NO ERROR.5 
The structural similarity between NO ERROR and HANDS can be illuminated 
by thinking of them as instances of a simple schema. Where a putatively revi-
sionary thesis (R) conflicts with a common-sensical Moorean premise (M), we can 
represent the form of these arguments as follows:  
 
SCHEMA        1.   If R then not-M  
2. M  
3. Not-R  
 
I will call instances of this schema Moorean arguments. One might take this 
shared schematic structure to suggest that Moorean arguments in ethics stand 
or fall with canonical Moorean arguments like HANDS.6 In this paper, I argue 
that this is not so.  
Much of the recent literature on Moorean arguments has focused on 
evaluating an important cluster of related objections to the use of Moorean 
                                                 
3 For simplicity of exposition, I set aside the possibility here that one could be a nihilist 
about properties and facts on quite general (e.g. Quinean) grounds. Someone holding such a 
view could still be a moral realist in virtue of thinking that many moral sentences are true 
and made so by the way the world is. 
4 Premise 2 is a general moral claim that strikes me as an optimal candidate moral Moorean 
premise. However, readers with a desire for greater formal symmetry between NO ERROR 
and HANDS (or strong particularist scruples) should feel free to substitute a highly plausible 
particular moral claim here.    
5 Compare the arguments suggested by Dworkin 1996, 117-8, Huemer 2005, 117, and Nagel 
1997, 115. These arguments each have important features that I cannot address here.  
6 What “standing” or “falling” amounts to is left intentionally imprecise. Some philosophers 
think that Moore’s arguments succeed at “offense,” giving skeptics and idealists reasons to 
give up their views (Kelly 2005). Others think that while Moore’s argument can succeed at 
“defense” – helping to justify our belief in the external world – it is dialectically ineffective 
against the skeptic (Pryor 2004). Since I am interested here in the prospects of the Moral 
Moorean argument relative to those of canonical Moorean arguments like HANDS, I set this 
important cluster of issues aside. 
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arguments. For example, it has been argued that Moorean arguments beg the 
question, or that they fail to transmit justification from their premises to their 
conclusions.7 Insofar as they have force, such worries typically afflict argu-
ments with the Moorean structure quite generally. The issues raised by these 
objections are highly complex, and I will not address them in this paper.  
I also set aside the crucial general question of how to adjudicate whether 
a certain view is common-sensical. This issue affects the potential targets of 
Moorean arguments. For example, George Berkeley claimed that his idealism 
systematized (rather than revised) common sense,8 but would-be Mooreans 
might be inclined to disagree, and take his view to be an apt target for Moo-
rean arguments.9 Similar issues arise in evaluating Simon Blackburn’s me-
taethical “quasi-realism” (see his 1993 and others), which is also presented as 
a hermeneutic account of our ethical discourse, and not as a revision to such 
talk.    
Even if these challenges to the Moorean can be resolved in his favor, his 
arguments would face a deeper explanatory burden: what explains their al-
leged positive epistemic force? Many Mooreans claim that this force is consi-
derable. Thus, as we have seen, Moore himself took the argument encapsu-
lated in HANDS to constitute a proof of the existence of the external world. 
Some contemporary philosophers have taken Moorean arguments to have 
striking metaphilosophical implications. For example, Tom Kelly argues that, 
for Moorean reasons, the skeptic “cannot win” in epistemology (2005, 181). 
Even more generally, Kit Fine suggests that the lesson of Moore’s arguments 
is that philosophers ought to be humble about what their arguments could 
possibly do to undermine what we ordinarily believe (2001, 2).  Fine and 
Kelly thus suggest that we do not need to wait for revisionary arguments to 
appear, and then apply Moorean arguments piecemeal. Rather, they suggest 
that properly understanding Moorean arguments allows us to know in ad-
vance that whole classes of possible revisionary arguments are unsound.  
 In this paper, I propose that the positive epistemic force of the canoni-
cal Moorean arguments can best be understood to rest on asymmetries in 
indirect evidence (§2). I then argue that this explanation suggests that Moo-
rean arguments are considerably less promising in ethics than they are against 
Moore’s own targets (§3). Finally, I rebut an important attempt to vindicate 
the Moorean strategy in ethics by appeal to a reflective equilibrium metho-
dology (§4).  
                                                 
7 For discussion of question-begging, see for example Sinnott-Armstrong 1999; for transmis-
sion failure, compare Davies (2000 and elsewhere) and Wright (2002 and elsewhere).  
8 An anonymous reviewer correctly points out that if Berkeley were correct on this point, 
Moorean arguments against Berkeleyan idealism might for this reason be weaker than Moo-
rean argument against metaethical error theory, which is explicitly a revisionary view.  
9 Moore himself famously attacked Berkeley’s slogan that “esse est percipi” in his 1903 Prin-
cipia Ethica. However, his argument here does not resemble his canonical Moorean argu-
ments. 
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As I am most interested here in the comparative merits of the moral 
Moorean’s strategy, I often talk in this paper as if canonical Moorean argu-
ments succeed. However, it should be emphasized that my proposal does not 
address the sorts of general challenges to the Moorean strategy mentioned 
above. My account is thus compatible with the claim that the positive epis-
temic force of canonical Moorean arguments is vitiated by their being objec-
tionably question-begging (for example). 
My argument suggests that Moore himself may have better understood 
the force of this form of argument than some of his contemporary sympa-
thizers. Thus, despite his own robust moral realism, Moore did not deploy 
such arguments in ethics, and there are no ethical claims among the allegedly 
common-sensical views that Moore catalogued in his A Defence of Common 
Sense (1959, 32-59).10 
 
1. The distinctiveness of Moorean arguments 
 
The standard way to rebut an argument is to attack its premises, thereby ex-
plaining why we should refrain from accepting one or more of them. The 
Moorean instead offers a competing argument for the falsity of the conclu-
sion of a revisionary argument. This strategy would, if successful, show that 
there must be something wrong with the revisionist’s argument. However, un-
like the standard sort of rebuttal, the Moorean strategy does nothing to locate 
the problem.  
What might vindicate the Moorean’s distinctive strategy? In responding 
to a skeptical argument that he attributed to Bertrand Russell, Moore offered 
an instructive comment:  
 
I cannot help answering: It seems to me more certain that I do know that this is 
a pencil and that you are conscious, than that a single one of these four as-
sumptions [of the skeptical argument] is true, let alone all four.  
(1959, 226: emphasis in original)  
 
Three things are notable about this passage. First, Moore does not even sug-
gest here that he has offered an explanation of what has gone wrong with 
Russell’s argument. In this respect, his response brings out the contrast with 
what I called the standard way to rebut an argument, which purports to lo-
cate and explain the error in the argument being rejected. Second, Moore ap-
peals to his judgments about certainty. Finally, he compares how certain he is 
in the Moorean premise with how certain he is in the grounds for accepting 
Russell’s skeptical conclusion.  
I take the final point, that the force of Moorean arguments rests on a 
comparative judgment, to be important and correct. I will discuss the impli-
                                                 
10 Contrast Soames 2003, 68-9, who claims that some of Moore’s arguments in ethics would 
have been improved by making them more continuous with his broader common-sensical 
approach. 
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cations of this insight in §§ 2 and 3 below. However, there is reason to think 
that an appeal to certainty cannot fully explain the force of Moorean argu-
ments.11 It is natural and common to interpret Moore’s talk of “certainty” as 
picking out a degree of psychological confidence in the truth of a claim.12 We 
might thus read Moore as appealing to the norm apportion your belief according to 
your confidence.13 This, however, is an extremely dubious epistemic principle, 
because it is possible – and often paradigmatic of epistemic irrationality – for 
one’s confidence in a thesis to fail to reflect one’s evidence for the truth of 
that thesis.14 The confidence principle thus threatens to vindicate reasoning 
grounded in wishful thinking or denial. However, in such cases, one ought 
rather to disregard one’s confidence in a proposition, and to seek to ameli-
orate its effects on one’s beliefs.15  
Despite these difficulties, one’s relative confidence in the truth of two 
conflicting claims need not be irrelevant to one’s reasonable evaluation of 
those claims. Insofar as one is epistemically virtuous, one’s confidence in a 
claim will tend to track the quality of the evidence that one has for the truth 
of that claim.16 Thus, confidence may serve as defeasible indirect evidence of 
the truth of a claim.17 My strategy for evaluating candidate Moorean argu-
ments generalizes on this insight. 
 
2. The generic indicators strategy 
 
The example of confidence provides a model for the most promising way of 
understanding the positive epistemic force of Moorean arguments. Our con-
fidence in a proposition provides us with a defeasible indication of the quali-
                                                 
11 Moore may have been tempted to this view because he saw no way to make further 
progress in evaluating one’s certainty in the truth of a claim. Thus, in the paper just cited, he 
goes on to ask the apparently rhetorical question: “And how on earth is it to be decided 
which of the two things [i.e. Russell’s skeptical thesis or his own common-sensical premise] 
it is rational to be most certain of?” (1959, 226; emphasis his). In this paper I suggest the out-
lines of an answer to this very question.  
12 However, for a helpful discussion of different ways of understanding Moore’s appeal to 
certainty, see Kelly 2005. 
13 Some contemporary philosophers appear attracted to this norm. For example, Pollock and 
Cruz claim that “It is reasonable to place more reliance on those beliefs in which we have 
greater confidence, and when beliefs come in conflict, we decide which to reject by consider-
ing which we are least certain of” (1999, 6). Similarly, Soames attributes to Moore (and per-
haps endorses) the idea that, in case of conflict, “Of course, one ought to give up whichever 
[claim] one has the least confidence in” (2003, 9).  
14 Kelly suggests further worries about the appeal to confidence at 2005, 191-4.  
15 This may, of course, be hard to do. For example, being made aware of one’s propensity to 
unrealistically positive self-assessment may not suffice to ameliorate that propensity (com-
pare Elga 2005, 4 and the psychological literature cited there). 
16 And perhaps also evidence that one had in the past but has since forgotten. Compare 
Harman 1986, 41 on the problem of forgotten evidence. 
17 I am indebted here to Tom Kelly, who once suggested the slogan “confidence is evidence 
of epistemic status.” He should not be held responsible for how I have developed that sug-
gestion here. 
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ty of our evidence for or against that proposition. I propose that we can best 
understand the epistemic force of a Moorean argument in terms of the indi-
rect evidence that we possess concerning the relative epistemic quality of the 
relevant Moorean and revisionary claims.  
There are two ways of understanding this appeal to indirect evidence, 
and only one of them is plausible, or has serious Moorean credentials. The 
first way to understand the appeal would be to suggest that, in order to re-
spond appropriately to a Moorean argument, someone must reason explicitly 
about the indirect evidence that she possesses. This interpretation would 
suggest implausibly that only philosophically sophisticated reasoners who 
have grasped something like my explication of Moorean arguments could 
deploy such arguments legitimately. I intend a different interpretation, on 
which reasoners do not need to make explicit the sorts of considerations that 
I am about to sketch. This is rather the task of philosophers hoping to explain 
the epistemic force of the Moorean arguments. For ordinary reasoners, it is 
enough to be inarticulately sensitive to this force.18 
Consider a simple example of how an appeal to indirect evidence might 
trump the sort of direct evidential considerations provided by an argument. 
Suppose that, after a dinner out together, we each independently add up our 
shares of the check, and come to different results. Typically this sort of dis-
crepancy might prompt us to each go back and check our math. However, in 
some cases, this will be unnecessary. If we both know that you are a signifi-
cantly better calculator in such contexts than I am, then we might both rea-
sonably accept your calculation as correct on the basis of this evidence. In 
such a case, my evidence about your abilities affects the weight that I should 
give to the evidence provided by the results of our respective calculations. 
This in turn may settle what we should each believe to be a fair division of 
the bill.  
The sort of indirect evidence that I take to be relevant to the evaluation 
of Moorean arguments is considerably more complex than that suggested in 
this example. I organize my discussion by examining a series of what I call 
generic indicators of epistemic quality of a proposition: features the presence or 
absence of which would, other things being equal, reasonably lead us to raise 
or lower our estimation of how well supported that proposition is. These fea-
tures are generic because they tend to indicate epistemically important distinc-
tions across varied epistemic contexts.  
I cannot canvass every such indicator here. I focus on a set of five indi-
cators that I take to be the weightiest for the purpose of evaluating Moorean 
arguments:  
 
1. Relative confidence in the Moorean and revisionary theses.  
2. Prevalence of philosophically naïve proponents of the revision.  
                                                 
18 Note that, by making the Moorean premise salient, Moorean arguments can serve a prag-
matic function of making it more likely that reasoners are sensitive to relevant indirect evi-
dence. 
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3. Extent and nature of the reorganization of our beliefs required by the revision.  
4. Relative consilience of the Moorean premise and the revision with our epis-
temic paradigms.  
5. Vulnerability of the Moorean premise to debunking explanations.  
 
My hypothesis is that whatever epistemic force canonical Moorean argu-
ments have against their revisionary targets can be explained by the fact that, 
in such arguments, these generic indicators together strongly favor the Moo-
rean premise over the revisionist alternative.  
I take the epistemic significance of each of these indicators to be highly 
plausible, and to be recognized as such by philosophers with divergent com-
mitments in epistemology. (Of course, different epistemic theories will sug-
gest different ways to refine these indicators, and to explain their signific-
ance.) In what follows, I offer a (necessarily schematic) defense of each of 
the indicators in turn. My hope is that this discussion sketches and motivates 
my view sufficiently to permit at least its provisional evaluation.  
First, we are more confident in the truth of some of our beliefs than in 
others.19 While our confidence can sometimes lead us astray, a variety of ap-
proaches to epistemology suggests reasons for taking one’s confidence to be 
a (defeasible) indicator of the quality of the evidence at one’s disposal. For 
example, Richard Foley notes that any remotely normal life presupposes trust 
in one’s own epistemic capacities (2001, 3). Because we routinely form beliefs 
on the basis of our confidence in the truth of a proposition, such self-trust in 
part involves taking one’s confidence to be a reliable indicator of one’s evi-
dence, other things equal. The epistemic significance of confidence might 
also be defended on broadly evolutionary20 or transcendental21 grounds.  
The idea that confidence is an indicator of epistemic quality helps to ex-
plain both the intuitive force of the attempt to explicate Moorean arguments 
solely in terms of confidence (mentioned in §1 above), and the failure of that 
attempt – thus, my confidence that P may constitute important indirect evi-
dence that P. However, it does not follow from the fact that I am very confi-
dent that P that it is reasonable for me to believe that P, because this evi-
dence might be outweighed or undercut.  
Moore took his arguments to defend the common sense of the folk 
against philosophical excess, so the appeal to non-philosophical consensus is 
                                                 
19 Much would need to be done to clarify the relevant notion of confidence. See Foley 2001, 
25-7 for some useful remarks.  
20 Compare Quine’s controversial thesis that we can take “encouragement in Darwin” that 
our inductive capacities latch on to the world: Quine’s idea is that incompetent generalizers 
tend to die out (1969, 126). Creatures with the tendency to radically misapportion their con-
fidence might for analogous reasons tend to be selected against.  
21 For example, mistrust in one’s own confidence as a guide to one’s evidence might be ar-
gued to threaten to undermine one’s presupposed status as a reasoner or self-intelligible be-
ing (especially given how bad we are at explicitly recalling and weighing our evidence). Such 
arguments might take inspiration from broadly transcendental considerations offered in Na-
gel 1997 and Davidson 2001. 
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Moorean in spirit.22 The idea that broad consensus is epistemically probative 
can be motivated by the objectionability of epistemic conceit. Thus, as I sug-
gested above, we typically appear to have good reasons to take our own epis-
temic capacities to be reasonably reliable. Absent some special story, it seems 
objectionable to take others’ epistemic capacities to be significantly inferior 
to one’s own in this respect.23  
Next, consider the epistemic significance of the sort of adjustment to 
one’s set of beliefs called for by a revisionary argument. One dimension of 
the scope of such adjustment is the number of particular claims that would 
require adjustment; perhaps more important is the diversity of such claims.24 
For example, the difference between skepticism about the external world and 
skepticism about other minds is not merely quantitative: the former threatens 
one’s beliefs about different kinds of subjects in a way that the latter does 
not. A Quinean metaphor makes the difference vivid: even a quantitatively 
massive adjustment like skepticism about other minds might be localized 
within the “web of belief.” By contrast, skepticism about the external world 
would leave little of the web untouched. The third indicator is based upon 
the idea that there are defeasible epistemic considerations against a revision 
as it increases in scope. This indicator reflects the importance of coherence 
with what one believes as an epistemic desideratum.25   
Another important indicator of epistemic quality concerns the relative 
consilience of the Moorean premise and the revisionary thesis with our epis-
temic paradigms. Briefly, our epistemic paradigms fall into three classes. 
First, there are paradigmatic sources of evidence: the ordinary inferential 
practices and epistemic rules of thumb that underwrite our lives as ordinary 
believers. Second, there are some of our central higher-order beliefs about 
reliable epistemic procedures. Finally, there are broader paradigms of epis-
temically successful enquiry, such as scientific enquiry. These sources and 
procedures comprise much of what we ordinarily take to ground our compe-
tence to evaluate epistemic claims. It is plausible that broad inconsistency 
                                                 
22 Moore himself noted another important asymmetry with respect to this indicator in the 
case of global idealism and skepticism: when considering whether skeptical or idealist hypo-
theses are true, I cannot consistently take it to count as evidence for such views that they 
have philosophically sophisticated proponents, for the hypothesis that such views are true is 
inconsistent with rational belief in the existence of such proponents (1959, 40).  
23 This claim might appear to involve controversial commitments in the current heated de-
bate concerning the epistemic significance of disagreement with one’s so-called “epistemic 
peers.” I would insist rather that the significance of consensus and the objectionability of 
epistemic conceit form part of the shared intuitive basis that generates the puzzles that drive 
the current debate over the significance of peer disagreement. 
24 Moore 1959, 32-3 emphasizes the number and diversity of the sort of common-sensical 
claims that he aims to defend. 
25 The idea that coherence is epistemically significant is of course not the unique property of 
coherentists. Bonjour (in his coherentist phase!) overstates the point only a little when he 
says that “…[coherence] is, and seemingly must be, a basic ingredient of virtually all rival 
epistemological theories as well” (1985, 94).  
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with such paradigms is a powerful indicator that something has gone wrong 
with a piece of reasoning.  
Finally, it counts against a thesis that we seek to deploy in argument that 
it is vulnerable to debunking explanations. An explanation debunks a proposi-
tion if it offers a compelling explanation for the proposition’s apparent evi-
dential status that gives us good reason to reject that status. Consider an ex-
ample: faced with an argument for error theory about beauty, I would be ill-
advised to deploy I am very beautiful as a Moorean premise (in part!) because 
this sort of judgment is vulnerable to a quite general debunking explanation 
grounded in the fact that North Americans tend to overestimate our socially 
desirable qualities.26 Although it may face other difficulties, the potential 
Moorean premise some sunsets are beautiful is not subject to this one.  
A thesis is vulnerable to such debunking explanations just to the degree 
that there are putative debunking explanations available which are credible hy-
potheses, given the state of our investigations. Roughly, for a hypothesis to 
be credible is for there to be something positive to be said (epistemically) for 
accepting it. This is imprecise, but I hope tolerably so. On the one hand, the 
mere fact that I can imagine a coherent chain of events that would debunk a 
thesis does not make that thesis vulnerable. On the other, one does not have 
to be adequately epistemically justified in believing a debunking explanation 
in order for a thesis to be vulnerable to it. The significance of vulnerability to 
debunking explanations is suggested by the notable effort that philosophers 
dedicate to constructing and rebutting such explanations.  
What light do these indicators shed on the canonical Moorean argu-
ments? It is important to note that, in accord with Moore’s suggestion noted 
in §1 above, I understand the significance of these indicators as comparative. 
Our question thus concerns how the Moorean premise fares against the revi-
sionist’s thesis relative to each of these indicators. I claim that canonical Moo-
rean arguments like HANDS rate very well in this respect.  
First, I am extremely confident in the Moorean premise that I have 
hands. As Moore would point out, I am likely more confident in it than I am 
in the premises of any skeptical argument. Second, there is significant inter-
personal consensus concerning the Moorean premise (among those who 
have thought about it), and extremely little philosophically naïve support for 
the revisionary thesis that the external world does not exist.27  
Third, accepting the conclusions of Moore’s central revisionist targets 
would arguably require massive and deep adjustment to one’s set of beliefs. 
Thus, giving up the belief in the external world would be no small thing. Af-
ter all, it calls into question virtually all of our factual judgments about the 
                                                 
26 Compare again Elga 2005 and the social psychology literature that he draws upon.  
27 Serious doubts about the existence of the external world are perhaps typically limited to 
philosophers, mystics, the demonstrably insane and perhaps certain adolescents obsessed 
with The Matrix. 
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world. The Moorean premise, by contrast, appears to require little revision to 
our beliefs.  
Fourth, the global skeptical revision threatens to undermine most of our 
ordinary epistemic paradigms concerning the day-to-day management of be-
lief, and also the status of our best scientific theories as methodological para-
digms, at least on the assumption that those theories purport to describe 
elements of the external world. As I noted at the beginning of §1, there may 
be some tension between the Moorean procedure and our ordinary norms 
for evaluating arguments, but this tension pales in comparison with the 
sweeping attack on our epistemic paradigms suggested by global skepticism.  
Finally, the Moorean premise I have hands is not the sort of thing that we 
ordinarily take to be particularly vulnerable to debunking.28 Nor, it seems to 
me, are the sorts of premises that are typically used to construct the best ar-
guments for skepticism and idealism. This indicator, then, will perhaps be a 
wash.  
Together, the indirect indicators suggest a striking asymmetry between 
the Moorean premise and its revisionary targets. Confidence, consensus, de-
mands to reorganize our beliefs, and consilience with our epistemic para-
digms all appear to clearly favor the Moorean. If this is correct, there is a 
natural explanation of the appeal of the canonical Moorean arguments: these 
arguments exemplify a nearly best-case scenario relative to the five indicators 
of epistemic quality introduced above. If the indirect indicators approach is 
on the right track, this suggests a very strong prima facie case for the Moorean 
in these cases. (Again, this does not show that the canonical Moorean argu-
ments succeed, as I have not addressed the global challenges to their adequa-
cy mentioned in the Introduction). 
 
3. Applying the indicators to ethics 
 
If the explanation just offered is plausible, it suggests a natural way to eva-
luate candidate Moorean arguments: examine how they fare relative to these 
same generic indicators of epistemic quality. In this section, I examine how 
these indicators apply to our exemplary moral Moorean argument NO ER-
                                                 
28 One of the changes in the dialectic concerning external world skepticism since the Early-
Modern period is that the debunking appeal to perceptual illusion that was part of the skep-
tical corpus has been thoroughly domesticated: cases where perception is unreliable have 
been delimited, and the only dialectical force of such appeals in the current debate is that 
they remind us that our perceptual capacities are fallible. It might be thought that evil demon 
and vat hypotheses are important debunking explanations for the belief that I have hands. 
However, this would be a mistake, as we typically have no specific evidence in favor of these 
hypotheses, and they are thus not credible in the sense introduced above. This does not un-
dercut the (non-debunking) role of such hypotheses in canonical skeptical arguments: skep-
tics typically argue that the mere possibility (or compatibility with our evidence, etc.) of such 
hypotheses, together with certain general epistemological premises, entails that we lack 
knowledge of the external world.  
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ROR, and to an analogous non-moral case. I argue that examination of these 
cases casts serious doubts on the Moorean strategy in ethics.  
The Moorean premise of NO ERROR does very well with respect to con-
fidence, the first indicator that I discussed. I am very confident that it is 
wrong to torture a child just for fun. Non-philosophical consensus is a trick-
ier matter. On the one hand, few would disagree with the Moorean premise 
just stated, so the Moorean premise does well with respect to this indicator. 
However, there are two respects in which the moral Moorean is in a weaker 
position relative to this indicator than the Moorean about hands.  
First, as every ethics professor knows, belief in error theory and other 
revisionary views about ethics is not restricted to philosophical sophisticates. 
Rather, these views are seen by many non-philosophers as elements of a 
clear-eyed realism about the world. Thus, we arguably do not see a broad 
non-philosophical consensus concerning the falsity of the revisionist’s thesis 
here.29 Second, there is a broader worry: while the claim that it would be 
wrong to torture innocent children for fun is widely shared, moral judgments 
on the whole are arguably paradigmatically controversial. This raises at least 
some worry that lack of controversy about specific moral judgments like this 
one is accidental, and this may undermine the force of consensus.    
Consider next the implications of the error-theoretic revision for our be-
liefs. Moral error theory requires sweeping revision to a merely local part of 
our belief system: our moral beliefs, and beliefs about morality. It thus in-
volves a much less radical revision to our beliefs than global skepticism. One 
might object that there is a strong analogy between the global threat to our 
practical commitments entailed by error theory, and the global threat to our 
beliefs about the world entailed by skepticism about the external world.30 
However, even on the most generous interpretation of this idea, there are 
two deep asymmetries.  
First, the error theory under examination attacks only morality, and not 
practical rationality per se (compare Joyce 2001). Such a view thus does not by 
itself pose a threat to our practical commitments that is analogously global to 
the threat posed by external world skepticism.31 Second, much of our ordi-
                                                 
29 Bill Wilcox suggests a natural objection here. Surely we also typically discover in our intro-
ductory ethics classes that our students’ attraction to views like error theory is seemingly 
founded on confusion. Can we use this sort of debunking explanation to undercut the ap-
pearance of disagreement just noted? One problem with this suggestion is that it would ge-
neralize in a way disadvantageous to the Moorean. Thus, even students who accept views 
that I take to be correct frequently offer poor reasoning in support of these views. I take it 
that the inability to articulately defend one’s pretheoretical views is ubiquitous, and should 
not be taken to debunk those views. I also take it that the Moorean should be especially sus-
picious of the requirement that we be able to offer an articulate defense of our views, as the 
Moorean can perhaps best be seen as the defender of the inarticulate folk against what he 
sees as the clever and articulate sophistry of the skeptic. 
30 I thank a number of commenters, and especially Gabe Mendlow, for pressing this point.  
31 Note that this depends in part on the correct view of the relationship between morality 
and practical reason. For example, certain Kantian views of practical reason suggest that all 
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nary moral knowledge concerns specific real cases (for example, slavery in 
the antebellum South) which be would be undermined by skepticism about 
the external world.32 By contrast, very little of our ordinary non-moral know-
ledge of the world would be undermined by accepting metaethical error 
theory. This is a clear respect in which the one revision is more global than 
the other. Note that this is a comparative claim: it is consistent with the ob-
vious fact that accepting metaethical error theory would require a very signif-
icant modification to most people’s beliefs.  
More strikingly, metaethical error theory also fails to threaten our epis-
temic paradigms as deeply as global skepticism. For example, beliefs about 
our perceptual access to medium-sized dry goods, the legitimacy of induction 
and the deliverances of physics would all presumably remain unaffected by 
the acceptance of metaethical error theory.  
Finally, I take the special vulnerability of our moral judgments to de-
bunking explanations to be perhaps the most profound problem for the use 
of Moorean arguments against moral revisionism. Ethical beliefs are subject 
to an extraordinary variety of interesting and relevantly local candidate de-
bunking explanations. I note only a few exemplary debunking arguments 
here.  
First, the fact of widespread moral controversy appears to make moral 
judgments especially vulnerable to debunking explanations. Thus, one of 
John Mackie’s central arguments for error theory appeal to what he takes to 
be massive and apparently rationally irresolvable moral disagreement, and to 
the idea that the best explanation of this disagreement lies in the sensitivity of 
our moral judgments to the different ways of life that people participate in 
(1977, 36-38).33 This explanation of moral controversy raises a worry about 
even apparently uncontroversial moral claims, such as the claim that it would 
be wrong to torture innocent children for fun. Thus, Mackie might explain 
                                                                                                                         
practical reasoning presupposes the correctness of categorical moral norms (compare for 
example Korsgaard 2003, 113-5). If this were true, moral error theory would generalize to 
entail error theory about practical reason.  
32 Bill Wilcox suggests that one might deny this claim by insisting that such “ordinary moral 
knowledge” is really complex knowledge, and the truly moral proposition involved is some-
thing completely general that would not be undermined by such skepticism. I find such a 
view independently implausible. I am sympathetic to the idea that the truth of particular 
moral claims may be ultimately explained in terms of necessarily true general moral prin-
ciples. However, this does not make knowledge of specific moral claims any less moral know-
ledge. Further, I take it that correctly identifying general moral principles is a rare and impres-
sive philosophical achievement, and one that is not required in order to have specific moral 
knowledge such as the knowledge that slavery in the American context was wrong. If this is 
true, skepticism about the external world would undercut a great deal of our moral know-
ledge.  
33 Some have thought that the variation of moral norms across historical and social contexts 
suggests that the norms accepted as moral at a time and place are simply a result of arbitrary 
social changes. Pinker goes so far as to suggest a sort of “Law of Conservation of Moraliza-
tion” that regulates this drift, ensuring that some socially undesirable outcomes are treated as 
matters of sin and virtue as opposed to matters of preference (2008, 34).  
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the lack of controversy here by appeal to the overlap between ways of life in 
different human communities. 
Second, as a significant body of empirical research has shown, the psy-
chological mechanisms that underwrite our moral judgments seem to be in-
tertwined with emotion (e.g. Greene 2007, Haidt 2001, Hauser 2006). Indeed, 
elicited disgust reactions have been shown to have some effect on the moral 
judgments that people make (Wheatley and Haidt 2005). It is typical to take 
such emotionally driven effects to be distorting factors in our cognitive lives. 
Some philosophers, including Josh Greene, have sought to develop debunk-
ing explanations of some of our moral judgments on the basis of their vulne-
rability to emotion.  
Third, our moral judgments also appear especially vulnerable to psycho-
logical pressures that we might think typically tend to distort our judgments. 
Consider first the effect of psychological pressure to rationalize one’s beha-
vior. Taking oneself to be doing bad things makes for cognitive dissonance. 
Sometimes this causes one to change one’s behavior in order to resolve the 
tension. However, we have all seen instances of the other way of resolving 
the tension: people changing their values to rationalize their own wants, or 
the activities called for by their social roles. Examples of this sort of pheno-
menon can be drawn from the stock characters of folk sociology: the ardent 
union leader changing his views following promotion to management, or the 
college anarchist who graduates, gets a job and becomes a conservative. Both 
ordinary folk and moral philosophers have recognized this sort of worry. For 
example, it is generally recognized that partiality can be a significant distorting 
factor in our moral thinking (compare Rawls 1951, 182 and Sinnott-
Armstrong 2006, 195-7).  
Finally, one might worry that our normative judgments are subject to 
distortion as the result of interpersonal pressure or manipulation. For exam-
ple, compare Gilbert Harman’s bargaining explanation for our belief in a 
moral asymmetry between harming and refusing to help. Harman suggests 
that the asymmetry arose because, while everyone would benefit from a pro-
hibition on harming, an enforced requirement to aid would be costly but not 
advantageous to the wealthy. The idea is that the existence of a robust prohi-
bition on harming and a modest requirement to aid result from a tacit com-
promise between the rich and poor (1977, 110). It is arguably natural to read 
this as a story of ideological influence, as Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2006, 
208-9) does, rather than as an account of the basis of legitimate moral norms, 
as Harman’s own view suggests.  
Examples like this suggest a general worry: that there are powerful social 
agents who have an interest in bringing the contents of our normative judg-
ments in line with their concerns, and that mechanisms of social influence on 
belief permit them to exercise such interests. Karen Jones suggests that such 
concerns about ideology may be “…the source of much ordinary skepticism 
about moral knowledge” (2006, 66). If this is correct, this form of debunking 
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argument has both philosophical resonance and an imaginative grip on ordi-
nary folk. 
Each of these potential sources of debunking explanations concerning 
our moral judgments is controversial. This brief survey also barely scratches 
the surface of the range of debunking explanations of our moral judgments 
that have been offered.34 These challenges to the epistemic quality of our 
moral judgments arguably leave our epistemic paradigms untouched. They 
thus suffice to mark what I take to be an important asymmetry with the ca-
nonical cases in which Moorean arguments appear strongest. My claim here 
is not that these debunking arguments are sound. Rather, it is that the moral 
Moorean faces a wider variety of putative debunking arguments which have 
some claim to be credible hypotheses, and whose existence thus gives us 
some reason to lower our estimation of the epistemic quality of moral Moo-
rean premises.  
The preceding survey suggests that moral Moorean arguments like NO 
ERROR compare unfavorably with Moore’s canonical arguments, relative to 
the generic indicators discussed. However, this does not suffice to show that 
moral Moorean arguments are not epistemically adequate responses to revi-
sionist arguments in ethics. This is because we require some means of assess-
ing how far a Moorean argument could diverge from the ideal case of the 
canonical arguments, while remaining compelling.  
Ideally, I would explore the answer to this question by examining a 
broad range of analogous cases. For the sake of brevity, however, I will con-
sider only two further exemplary cases. My first case aims to make a very 
modest point: that some arguments that fit the simple Moorean schema dis-
cussed in the Introduction clearly fail. The second case bears important anal-
ogies to NO ERROR, and thus helps to provide insight into the question just 
posed. 
The clearest cases where structurally Moorean arguments fail are those 
in which pretheoretically seemingly obvious claims have been disproven by 
scientific investigation. I take the history of science to suggest many such 
cases: consider the surprising discoveries that have been made concerning 
the size of heavenly bodies, the roughly spherical shape of the earth, and the 
relativity of motion. As an example, suppose that one is confronted for the 
first time with the evidence for a well-supported atomic theory which entails 
that most of the volume of ordinary objects is made up of empty space. One 
might respond with the following Moorean argument: 
 
BRICK        1.  According to contemporary physical theory, this brick is not  
 solid, but is rather mostly made up of empty space. 
                                                 
34 Debunking explanations that have been proposed regarding morality range from the so-
phisticated and narrowly focused undermining of specific intuitions that is part of the nor-
mative ethicist’s stock in trade to the more sweeping undermining arguments that have been 
put forward by philosophers, historians, anthropologists, social theorists, feminists, psychol-
ogists and others.  
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2. But [raps knuckles on brick for emphasis] this brick is as solid as 
could be. No empty space here._____________________  
3. Contemporary physical theory is mistaken. 
 
I hope that you will agree that this argument does not succeed. (If you think 
that I have ill-described this scenario, feel free to replace it with another ex-
ample of a surprising scientific discovery.)  
We can tell a plausible story about why BRICK fails by appealing to the 
generic indicators. The Moorean premise may (at the relevant time) have 
scored well on confidence and consensus. However, the revision to our be-
liefs is very local (it affects only our views about solidity), and the revisionist 
thesis has epistemic paradigms on its side: since Galileo we have learned to 
accord the results of increasingly robust experimental methodology epistemic 
priority over our intuitive interpretations of physical phenomena. Finally, 
there is a clear debunking explanation of the would-be Moorean premise 
here: once we realize that there is a contrast between being solid and having 
no visible holes, it become plausible that the Moorean premise here may rest 
upon a conflation of these two properties. A plausible explanation of why 
BRICK fails is that, together, these indicators favor the revisionist over the 
Moorean. 
Some philosophers attracted to Moore’s argumentative strategy describe 
Moorean premises (such as I have hands) as “Moorean facts.” BRICK helps to 
remove two temptations that such talk might appear to invite. First, such talk 
might trick us into thinking that we have a pretheoretical grip on which 
propositions are Moorean facts. Second, it might lead us to think that it is 
some absolute or intrinsic feature of a proposition that makes it a Moorean 
fact. Both of these ideas are mistaken.  
First, “Moorean fact” is a term of art: it plausibly refers to a proposition 
that would play the required role in a sound Moorean argument. We should 
thus not assume that, having been given examples such as here’s a hand and 
things move, we are able to intuitively sort further cases with respect to this 
category. BRICK is helpful here, because it casts doubt on the idea that we 
can intuitively identify Moorean facts. Thus, it may have been reasonable for 
a 17th century enquirer, lacking a competing argument from physical theory, 
to believe that the solidity of a granite slab was (in effect) a Moorean fact.  
Second, as I have suggested, the epistemically crucial features of Moo-
rean arguments are most plausibly understood in relative, and not absolute, 
terms. The Moorean argument in BRICK fails. However, an analogous argu-
ment with the same “Moorean” premise might have succeeded in a different 
context. For example, the evident solidity of a brick might have played a cen-
tral role in a rationally persuasive rebuttal to a flimsy revisionary argument 
based in speculative metaphysics. (Such an argument would, of course, need 
to be deployed before physical theorizing undermines the plausibility of the 
Moorean premise.) This is because we assess each of the five epistemic indi-
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cators that I have discussed comparatively, when we use them to evaluate a 
Moorean argument.  
BRICK thus shows us that some putative Moorean arguments fail, and 
that the generic indicators account can explain the failure as well as the suc-
cess of such arguments. Our next case sheds more direct light upon the mor-
al Moorean’s case.  
Suppose that one were confronted with an argument for mereological 
nihilism, and responded with the following Moorean argument: 
 
TABLE       1. According to mereological nihilism, the only material objects that 
exist are simples: objects with no parts. 
2. This table exists, and it is pretty clearly a complex material object: 
the legs even detach.  
3. Mereological nihilism is false.  
 
This argument has the by-now familiar Moorean structure. As most of us are 
presumably quite confident of analogues of the second premise of this argu-
ment, confidence and consensus may favor the Moorean here. Nonetheless, I 
think that TABLE is intuitively an unsatisfactory response to arguments for 
mereological nihilism, and that reflection on the remaining indirect indicators 
can help to explain why.  
Consider first the sort of reorganization of our beliefs called for by me-
reological nihilism. Accepting mereological nihilism would commit one to 
altering a huge number of one’s beliefs. However, those beliefs would all 
concern the existence of apparently complex objects. Further, there is a sim-
ple recipe for retaining almost all of the structure of one’s beliefs here: one 
replaces each belief that there is a complex F with the belief that there are simples 
arranged F-wise. This suggests that the reorganization called for by mereologi-
cal nihilism is, while broad, not very radical. Further, given the transforma-
tion suggested by this recipe, one’s methodological paradigms would not be 
threatened.35 Accepting mereological nihilism would thus not threaten our 
beliefs in nearly the deep and systematic way that global skepticism would.  
Another reason to be suspicious of TABLE can be brought out by noting 
a point often made in metaontological debates: that it is unclear how ade-
quately we understand the contrast between the claim that there are simples 
arranged tablewise, and the claim that those simples constitute a distinct ob-
ject: the table.36 This suggests a potentially powerful debunking argument 
against the putative Moorean premise: we are certainly confident that there 
are tables around rather than, say, cleverly disguised Martians or nothing at all. 
Perhaps we mistake this contrastive confidence for confidence that there are 
                                                 
35 Setting aside the crucial complication that our best physical theories may not be compati-
ble with an ontology of simples! 
36 Putnam (2004, 37) is perhaps blunter than most mereological quietists when he says: “to 
ask whether mereological sums really exist would be stupid.”  
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tables simpliciter, because we are simply not used to thinking about mereologi-
cal hypotheses.37  
None of this suggests that mereological nihilism is correct. My claim is 
rather that, even if we accept canonical Moorean arguments like HANDS, we 
need not accept TABLE as an analogous rebuttal to serious arguments for me-
reological nihilism. I claim that the contrast between the generic epistemic 
indicators as they apply to these cases helps to explain why TABLE fails.38  
This conclusion is important, because TABLE bears important similarities 
to our moral Moorean argument NO ERROR, with respect to these epistemic 
indicators. In both cases, there is at least close to a non-philosophical con-
sensus about the Moorean premise, and I presume that we are asymmetrically 
confident in that premise. I have also suggested that in both cases the revi-
sionist challenge to our beliefs is broad but in an important sense localized, 
and that our strongest epistemic paradigms are not threatened by the revi-
sion. Finally, I have suggested that the Moorean premise in TABLE is vulner-
able to a very salient debunking explanation. The moral Moorean premise 
appears more vulnerable in this respect, given the variety of credible putative 
debunking explanations of our moral judgments that are on offer.  
I argued that the pattern in the generic epistemic indicators explains the 
failure of TABLE. If this is so, the parallels just sketched suggest poor pros-
pects for Moorean arguments in ethics. This is because, as I have just sug-
gested, the very features which explained the epistemic inadequacy of TABLE 
are also in place in the moral case. 
  
4. The appeal to reflective equilibrium 
 
Someone sympathetic to moral Moorean arguments might suggest that the 
indirect indicators strategy is the wrong way to assess the positive epistemic 
force of Moorean arguments. In this section, I briefly discuss what I take to 
be the most important alternative explanation of this force. This explanation 
appeals to a broader “reflective equilibrium” conception of philosophical me-
thodology.  
One of the most ambitious contemporary defenders of Moorean argu-
ments is Tom Kelly. Kelly argues that the epistemic norm that explains the 
force of Moorean arguments is the following: a Moorean argument is a good 
                                                 
37 Note that this sort of contrastive debunking also threatens the moral Moorean argument. 
Thus, I am sometimes tempted by the thought that my confidence in the moral Moorean 
premise really just reflects my certainty that torturing children for fun is wrong rather than 
okay, or that, if anything is wrong, torturing children for fun is wrong. I cannot believe that the 
true moral theory could tell me that torturing children is okay. However, error theory need 
tell me no such thing: it may undercut claims of moral permissibility along with claims of 
wrongness.  
38 A few people have suggested to me that they take TABLE to be a successful Moorean argu-
ment. I find this intuitively implausible. However, it is worth noting that if these philoso-
phers were correct about TABLE, then, other things being equal, my generic indicators ap-
proach would suggest a more optimistic conclusion about moral Moorean arguments.  
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one just in case it is more reasonable to retain the common-sensical thesis rather 
than the conjunction of the skeptical premises (Kelly 2005, 194). Call this 
Kelly’s norm. Kelly himself suggests that this norm is “close to trivial,” simply 
stating the epistemically obvious.  
This does not mean that it is always impossible to usefully apply Kelly’s 
norm. After all, we often have a clear grip on which of two conflicting claims 
is better epistemically supported, and, in these cases, Kelly’s norm seems easy 
to apply. However, Kelly’s norm is, in many crucial cases, of little help. What 
we would like is a more explanatorily substantive account of how to apply 
such a norm. The indirect indicators strategy is intended to play this role. 
Kelly himself suggests that a more substantive vindication of the force of 
Moorean arguments can be found by appealing to John Rawls’ method of 
reflective equilibrium. 
Kelly is not alone in appealing to reflective equilibrium as a methodolog-
ical foundation for Mooreanism.39 For example, Michael Huemer makes a 
similar appeal while defending a broadly Moorean response to moral nihil-
ism: “It is highly unlikely that it [the method of reflective equilibrium] could 
ever lead us to endorse [moral] nihilism, as the latter requires a rejection of 
our entire body of moral beliefs.” (2005, 117). I shall call this explanation of 
the alleged success of moral Moorean arguments the conservative hypothesis. 
In this section, I argue for two claims. More narrowly, I argue that the 
conservative hypothesis fails. This suggests that moral Moorean arguments 
cannot be saved by appeal to reflective equilibrium. More broadly, I argue 
that, insofar as the method of reflective equilibrium is plausible, it fails to of-
fer the more substantive guidance that Kelly takes it to provide in assessing 
Moorean arguments.  
 The conservative hypothesis appears attractive as a defense of the Moo-
rean strategy in ethics because the method of reflective equilibrium can ap-
pear to have two features. First, especially in ethics, it is often taken to be 
something close to methodological common ground.40 Second, reflective 
equilibrium can appear to be conservative in just the way that Huemer sug-
gests is required to vindicate Mooreanism. However, this combination of ap-
pearances is deceptive. In order to see why, we must examine the progress of 
one central debate about reflective equilibrium.   
In barest outline, Rawls’ method of reflective equilibrium proposes that 
we decide moral questions by following a three-stage procedure. First, we 
assemble our “considered judgments” about particular moral cases. Rawls 
uses this term to refer to those judgments that one stably affirms in condi-
                                                 
39 Compare similar suggestions in Pollock and Cruz 1999, 7n3 and perhaps also in Dworkin 
1996, 119. 
40 Two examples suggest the flavor of philosophical endorsements of the method. First, 
Smith suggests that Rawls’ account of reflective equilibrium successfully systematized our 
methodological platitudes in ethics (1994, 40). Second, Kagan suggests that all practicing 
normative theorists are at least implicitly committed to something very similar to the method 
(1998, 16).  
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tions which minimize what we intuitively take to be sources of error, such as 
strong emotion or self-interest (1951, 181-3; see also 1999b, 42). The second 
stage is to find general moral principles that explain these judgments. The 
final stage is to adjust some of the considered judgments and principles, as 
necessary, in order to produce “equilibrium”: roughly, coherence within this 
system of judgments and principles (1951, 184-9).41   
Rawls himself insisted upon a crucial refinement to this method, telling 
us to aim at what he called a “wide” (rather than “narrow”) reflective equili-
brium.42 An equilibrium is wide if it is reasoned to from informationally ideal 
circumstances. For Rawls, these ideal circumstances consist in one’s initial 
stock of considered judgments being augmented by exposure to all plausible 
conceptions of morality and all reasonable arguments in favor of (and, one 
supposes, against) each of these conceptions (1999b, 43; 1999a, 289).   
Norman Daniels, an influential champion of wide reflective equilibrium, 
puts the point of the revision forcefully:  
 
Narrow equilibrium… is particularly ill-suited to provide a basis for a justifica-
tional argument…. If we have reason to suspect that the initial judgments are 
the product of bias, historical accident, or ideology, then these elementary cohe-
rence considerations alone give us little basis for comfort. (1979, 258n4)   
 
The move from narrow to wide reflective equilibrium provides some relief 
from the conservatism of the narrow method.43 For example, it permits the 
use of debunking arguments in one’s moral methodology. The fact that it 
permits us to utilize such debunking arguments is a weighty reason to prefer 
the wide version of the method to the narrow variant.  
The crucial question is thus whether a wide reflective equilibrium method 
would vindicate Huemer’s conservative hypothesis. This is a difficult ques-
tion, but one reason to think that it would is that the imagined wide reflective 
equilibrium ideal is still fundamentally dispositional: we are asked to imagine 
an agent exposed to a massive set of new information, and what that agent 
would then do to render her set of judgments coherent. Someone might rea-
sonably conclude from reflecting upon her own psychology that it is unlikely 
that she would ever be moved by error-theoretic arguments. After all, if one 
has not been moved by such arguments in the past, one might have at least 
modest grounds for supposing that one would not be moved by them in the 
future. 
This line of reasoning thus appears to support the conservative hypothe-
sis. However, it does so only in virtue of what some philosophers have taken 
                                                 
41 I am abstracting away from a host of fascinating features of Rawls’ 1951 proposal here, to 
focus on those issues most relevant to moral Mooreanism. 
42 Rawls introduces the term “wide reflective equilibrium” in 1999a, 289. However, he makes 
it clear there that he intends this to have the same sense as what he calls the “philosophically 
relevant” equilibrium in 1999b, 43.   
43 Not everyone is convinced that wide reflective equilibrium suffices to escape this problem. 
See Hare 1973, Singer 1974 and Copp 1985 for classic statements of remaining worries.  
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to be the central problematic feature of the reflective equilibrium methodol-
ogy. I noted in §1 that the problem with the simplistic confidence account of 
the force of Moorean arguments is that we might be irrationally confident. 
The problem here is analogous: just as we might be irrationally confident, we 
might be disposed to react irrationally to our evidence in the imagined in-
formationally ideal circumstances.  
Steven Stich and Richard Nisbett famously argued that such a possibility 
is not mere philosophical fantasy. Ordinary reasoners display robust en-
dorsement of irrational inference patterns such as the gambler’s fallacy (1980, 
192-3). The existence of rationally compelling arguments against these infe-
rence patterns renders it unreasonable to utilize the gambler’s fallacy pattern 
of inference. However, such arguments are not guaranteed to be psychologi-
cally effective merely in virtue of being rationally compelling. Nor are bad 
arguments in favor of the gambler’s fallacy guaranteed to be psychologically 
ineffective (1980, 196-7). All will depend on how we are disposed to react to 
such evidence. Stich and Nisbett thus suggest that, given the actual behavior 
of ordinary reasoners, it may be empirically plausible that objectionable prin-
ciples such as the gambler’s fallacy could survive into a wide reflective equili-
brium. 
One could develop the reflective equilibrium methodology in a way that 
explicitly addresses this concern. The natural way to do so would be to elimi-
nate the residue of dispositional elements that remain in the wide reflective 
equilibrium account. Thus, instead of asking what one would in fact do if 
exposed to assorted arguments for and against the gambler’s fallacy (where 
one possible answer is: fall even harder for it than before!), ask what one 
ought to do when presented with such evidence. However, as it is stripped of 
its dispositional elements, the method of reflective equilibrium becomes, like 
Kelly’s norm, more plausible at the expense of being less informative. At the 
limit, it will become hard to distinguish the view from the platitudinous norm 
apportion your beliefs to your total evidence.44 This modification would thus make it 
unclear whether reflective equilibrium would vindicate Moorean arguments, 
in ethics or elsewhere.  
This, I take it, is how it should be. It is helpful in this context to consid-
er an analogy to astrological belief. Absent peculiar and powerful misleading 
evidence, I take the believer in astrology to be another clear example of 
someone whose defense of his beliefs on Moorean grounds should fail. If 
not, the Moorean strategy provides only the coldest of comfort in the face of 
revisionary argument.  Indeed, I take it that an attempted Moorean defense 
of astrological belief should fail even if: 
 
1. the believer is extremely confident in the astrological claims, such that 
no new information would in fact change his mind, and  
2. debunking astrology involves rejecting the “entire body” of his astro-
logical beliefs.  
                                                 
44 Compare Siegel 1992 for this worry.  
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Stripped of its dispositional elements, the method of reflective equilibrium is 
compatible with debunking astrology even when conditions (1) and (2) 
hold.45 If this is so, the fact that moral judgments satisfy conditions analogous 
to (1) and (2) cannot underwrite the Moorean strategy in ethics, if the me-
thod of reflective equilibrium is the correct explanation of the force of such a 
strategy. This spells trouble for the moral Moorean, because it was exactly 
these conditions that Huemer used to motivate the conservative hypothesis 





The extension of Moorean arguments to ethics can appear at first blush to be 
inevitable. This, I think, is partly a result of an ambiguity that has bedeviled 
expressions of the basic Moorean idea. This is the ambiguity of terms like 
“certainty” and “plausibility,” which we can understand as indicating either a 
certain positive psychological attitude toward a proposition, or that proposi-
tion’s possessing a certain evidential status. Slurring over this ambiguity can 
make the moral Moorean strategy look like a sure-fire winner, as we are in-
deed extremely confident in some of our moral judgments. I have suggested 
that once the distinction is made, confidence has to compete with other indi-
cators of epistemic quality. I have then argued that this framework for under-
standing the force of Moorean arguments casts serious doubts on the Moo-
rean strategy in ethics. 
I take this to be a significant result in moral epistemology, but it is im-
portant to clarify what does and does not follow from it. First, this conclu-
sion does not entail the success of any sort of revisionism in ethics. Nothing 
I have said here suggests that moral Moorean arguments never rationally 
compel assent. As I have emphasized, the indicators are to be evaluated 
comparatively, so Moorean arguments in ethics may be sufficient to rebut 
relatively weak revisionary arguments. Nor does my argument militate against 
the use of non-Moorean arguments that rebut the premises of relevant revi-
sionary arguments. Thus, I take there to be a number of attractive rebuttals 
to the standard arguments that have been offered for metaethical error 
theory.  
                                                 
45 Scanlon offers a helpful discussion of the astrological believer and reflective equilibrium in 
2003, 145-6. It is revealing that, in explaining what he takes to be the Rawlsian case for 
asymmetry between ethics and astrology, Scanlon appeals to Rawls’ claim that our concep-
tion of justice has no controversial empirical or metaphysical presuppositions. If Scanlon is 
correct, a Rawlsian response to error theory is not Moorean. Rather, it involves fleshing out a 
broad conception of the nature of morality that shows the error theorist to argue from an 
allegedly mistaken presupposition about the metaphysical commitments implicit in moral 
judgment. 
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All this has simply supposed for the sake of argument that the Moorean 
has a sufficient answer to the various global objections to the Moorean ar-
gument form. The discussion here thus does not entail a view about the ulti-
mate success of the canonical uses of Moorean argument. However, it does 
help to clarify the dialectic. By casting the issue in terms of indirect evidence, 
my account suggests on the one hand that would-be Mooreans have to be 
circumspect about what they seek to include in what David Armstrong called 
the “Moorean corpus” (1999, 79): not just anything that they are overwhel-
mingly confident in will do. On the other hand, the account makes the Moo-
rean appear less like an unreasonable dogmatist, by pointing out that in the 
canonical Moorean arguments, there is an array of powerful indirect evidence 
providing implicit support for the Moorean’s maneuver. This may make it 
easier for the Moorean to resist some of the charges that are levied against 
her view. It may also be helpful to the Moorean cause to be able to explain in 
a principled way (as I have sought to do) why her view does not generalize to 
cases like BRICK or the defense of astrology.  
If the generic indicators account is the right way to understand Moorean 
arguments, it may even help to vindicate the more ambitious Moorean me-
thodological programs that I briefly noted in the Introduction. These pro-
grams involved drawing lessons from Moorean arguments to explain not on-
ly why certain particular revisionist arguments fail, but also to vindicate 
broader dismissals of whole classes of revisionism. I have suggested that the 
canonical Moorean premises score nearly maximally on the whole range of 
indirect indicators. Very few philosophical theses can make such a claim. The 
generic indicators account could be taken to suggest that in virtue of this, the 
prospects for a successful philosophical argument for a revisionist conclusion 
in Moore’s canonical cases are hopelessly dim.  
I used Moore’s question “And how on earth is it to be decided which of 
the two things it is rational to be most certain of?” (1959, 226) as an epigraph 
for this paper. I take this to be a real question, and not a rhetorical invitation 
to despair. My hope is that this paper has contributed in a small way to ans-
wering it.46       
 
Tristram McPherson 
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46 I am indebted to many people for helpful comments on previous drafts of this paper. 
These include Bill Fitzpatrick, Gabe Mendlow, John Maier, Philip Pettit, Mark Schroeder, 
Prerna Singh, Jason Ford, Mark Newman, Sean Walsh, Bill Wilcox, David Plunkett and an 
anonymous reviewer for JESP. I also want to thank audiences at the Minnesota Philosophi-
cal Society and at Princeton University’s Department of Philosophy and Center for Human 
Values for helpful comments on this material. Finally, I owe special thanks to Tom Kelly for 
helping to inspire my interest in this topic, and for providing both feedback and a powerful 
foil to my views as they developed.    
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